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Abstract
The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical re-
strictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the
scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when
retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs.
In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers’ information and
deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating
retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces
profits and increases the short-run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can
facilitate collusion and it reduces total welfare whenever firms choose to adopt
it.
Non Technical Summary
The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical
restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude.
Although competition authorities’ attitude towards vertical restraints
varies substantially across countries, price restrictions are often treated less
favorably than non-price restrictions such as exclusive territories, selective
distribution, etc. While there are some variations according to the nature
of the price restriction, Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) is for example
generally viewed as per se illegal or, at the very least, as most probably
undesirable.
This consensus against RPM contrasts with the economic analysis of
vertical restraints, which shows that both price and non-price vertical re-
strictions may either improve or harm economic efficiency – and often pro-
vide alternative ways to achieve the same objective. Furthermore, most of
the arguments made by the courts to justify their tolerant attitude towards
non-price restrictions would apply as well to RPM . There is, however, one
argument made in practice against RPM , which is that it could facilitate
horizontal agreements.
The present paper explores this argument in more detail and starts from
the idea that, under RPM , retail prices are centrally set by the manufacturer
and thus do not fully adjust to local variations on retail costs or demand; as
a result, retail prices are more uniform under RPM , and deviations from a
tacit agreement are thus more easily detected; it follows that RPM , while
being less efficient since it generates less flexible prices, can be adopted to
facilitate interbrand collusion.
In our model, long-lived producers sell to short-sighted retailers. In each
period, each producer signs an exclusive contract with a retailer. Demand
is stochastic, and retailers receive private information on their demand after
contracting but before the good is delivered to the market. Retail prices,
but not wholesale prices, are observable by competitors. We derive the most
profitable collusive equilibrium in two cases: in the first case, vertical con-
tracts are restricted to franchise contracts while in the second case, producers
can moreover control the retail price (RPM). When RPM is banned, retail
prices react to retailers’ information, which makes it harder to detect a de-
viation from collusive behavior. By eliminating retailers’ pricing discretion,
RPM facilitates the detection of such deviations. On the other hand, RPM
rigidifies retail prices and, ceteris paribus, reduces profits; it thereby raises
the short-run incentives to deviate. We characterize the situations where
RPM effectively increases collusive equilibrium profits.
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We also show that, when collusion is a serious concern, RPM reduces
welfare whenever it allows firms to increase their profits. The key point is
that while price rigidity facilitates the detection of a deviation for a collusive
agreement, it reduces the profitability of the collusive outcome. Thus, col-
luding firms will impose RPM only when the increase in the collusive price is
high enough to compensate them from the negative impact on profits. This
effect is strong enough to offset the potential welfare benefits that RPM may
generate. As a result welfare is reduced when RPM is allowed. This result
is reinforced by the fact that RPM may also increase the ability of firms to
punish a participant after a deviation.
We also compare RPM with alternative vertical restraints and show that,
compared with non-price restrictions, RPM provides firms with a better
instrument to detect deviations from collusion.
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1 Introduction
Although competition authorities’ attitude towards vertical restraints varies
substantially across countries, price restrictions are often treated less favor-
ably than non-price restrictions such as exclusive territories, selective distri-
bution, etc. While there are some variations according to the nature of the
price restriction (advertised or recommended prices, price floors, price ceil-
ings, etc.), Resale Price Maintenance (RPM, whereby retail prices are set by
manufacturers rather than by distributors) is for example generally viewed
as per se illegal or, at the very least, as most probably undesirable.1
This consensus against RPM contrasts with the economic analysis of verti-
cal restraints, which shows that both price and non-price vertical restrictions
may either improve or harm economic efficiency – and often provide alterna-
tive ways to achieve the same objective. Furthermore, most of the arguments
made by the courts to justify their tolerant attitude towards non-price restric-
tions would apply as well to RPM. For example, in GTE Sylvania, the US
Supreme Court mainly gives two arguments to abandon the per se illegality
of exclusive territories: a) non-price vertical restraints improve the efficiency
of supply; b) non-price restrictions stimulate interbrand competition, while
price restrictions are more likely to reduce it. It is interesting to review those
two lines of arguments in the light of the economic literature on RPM and
exclusive territories.
• Efficient supply of goods and services
The Supreme Court summarized its argument as follows:
“Established manufacturers can use [vertical restrictions] to induce re-
tailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair
facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. The avail-
ability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer’s goodwill and the
competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the
so-called “free-rider” effect, these services might not be provided by retailers
in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer’s benefit
would be greater if all provided the services than if none did”.2
This argument applies to RPM as well: by eliminating intrabrand com-
petition on prices and guaranteeing a minimal retail margin, RPM actually
1In France, for example, price floors are per se illegal under article 34 of the 1986
Ordinance; RPM (including price ceilings) can also constitute a restriction of competition
under article 7 as well as an abuse of economic dependance under article 8 of the same
Ordinance. For a broad overview of the attitude towards price and non-price restrictions,
see OECD (1994).
2433 U.S. (1977) at 55.
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stimulates intrabrand competition for services and induce distributors to sup-
ply better retail services.3 Furthermore, both price and non-price restrictions
may improve efficiency but also raise profits at the expense of consumer sur-
plus and total welfare.4
• Impact on interbrand competition
The Supreme Court also mentioned the “redeeming virtues” of vertical
restrictions on interbrand competition:
“Vertical restrictions promote inter-brand competition by allowing the
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products.
These “redeeming virtues” are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical
restrictions under the rule of reason. Economists have identified a number
of ways in which manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more
effectively against other manufacturers. For example, new manufacturers
and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to
induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment
of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products
unknown to the consumers”.5
Economic analysis indeed suggests that vertical restraints may encour-
age entry and thus promote interbrand competition, e.g. by allowing greater
efficiency.6 But there again, the argument is not limited to non-price verti-
3The Court actually almost recognized later in Monsanto (465 U.S. 752 (1984) at 762-
3) that price restrictions may constitute a better tool for improving supply efficiency: “It
is precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a particular marketing
strategy by means of agreements on often costly non-price restrictions that it will have
the most interest in the distributors’ resale prices. The manufacturer often will want to
ensure that its distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and
training additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical features of the products, and
will want to see that “free-riders” do not interfere”.
4The best quality/price ratio, for example, is not the same for firms, who focus on
demand and thus on their marginal customers, and for customers as a whole, including
infra-marginal ones –see Spence (1975); therefore, allowing firms to improve vertical coor-
dination may either benefit or harm consumers and total welfare –see Caillaud-Rey (1987)
and Besanko-Perry (1997). Rey-Tirole (1986) offers an overview of the relative merits of
price and non-price restrictions in improving vertical coordination between a manufacturer
and its retailers.
Vertical restraints can also help producers to better exploit their market power (at the
detriment of consumers and of economic efficiency), by limiting the scope for opportunistic
behavior vis-a`-vis their retailers; however, both exclusive territories and price control can
be used to that effect –see O’Brien-Shaffer (1992).
5433 U.S. (1977) at 54-55.
6Vertical restraints may also attract more entrants in the long run by reducing com-
petition in the short-run. This line of argument needs however to be qualified, since the
trade-off between ex ante and ex post competition often generates ambiguous results.
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cal restrictions: price restrictions, too, can increase the profitability of the
relationship between manufacturers and distributors.
There is also an abundant literature on the adverse impact of vertical re-
straints on interbrand competition. Many effects rely on the idea of strategic
delegation, where manufacturers give more freedom to their retailers in order
to commit themselves to respond more “appropriately” to their rivals’ pric-
ing strategies; in that respect, RPM goes the wrong way since it reduces the
retailers’ freedom of action. In contrast, granting exclusive territories gives
more freedom to retailers, and can thus be used strategically by producers
to reduce interbrand as well as intrabrand competition.7 Vertical restraints
can also be used to deter entry of potentially more efficient rivals.8 But there
again, the type of restraints that can serve strategic purposes are not price
restrictions but exclusivity restrictions or restrictions that give more freedom
to the distributors in the choice of retail prices. For example, assigning ex-
clusive territories makes retailers more aggressive in the case of entry and
might thus be used to deter local entry, which would instead be encouraged
if RPM limited incumbent retailers’ ability to respond.
Overall, the economic analysis thus does not appear to call for a less
tolerant attitude towards price restrictions9 (the last line of argument even
suggests instead to be less permissive towards non-price restrictions). There
is, however, one last argument made in practice against RPM, which is that it
could facilitate horizontal agreements. For example, in Business Electronics,
the Supreme Court repeated its previous statement to justify the per se
illegality of RPM:
“Our opinion in GTE Sylvania noted a significant distinction between
vertical non-price and vertical price restraints. That is, there was support
for the proposition that vertical price restraints reduce inter-brand price com-
petition because they “facilitate cartelizing”.... The authorities cited by the
Court suggested how vertical price agreements might assist horizontal price
fixing at the manufacturer level (by reducing the manufacturer’s incentive to
cheat on a cartel, since its retailers could not pass on lower prices to con-
7See for example Rey-Stiglitz (1988, 1995). This argument has recently been empirically
tested by Slade (1998) in the context of a change of regulation in the UK beer industry.
8For example, long-term exclusive dealing contracts can raise entry barriers – see
Aghion-Bolton (1987) and Hart-Tirole (1990). For a review of the literature on market
foreclosure, see Rey-Tirole (1996). Comanor-Rey (1998) shows how well-established dis-
tributors can block the entry of more efficient rivals and discusses in this light the recent
action of the Federal Trade Commission against TOY R’US.
9The Supreme Court later recognized this issue in Business Electronics, where it men-
tions the difficulty of defining a clear dividing line between per se illegal price restraints
and non-price vertical restraints to be judged under the rule of reason, given that both
affected retail prices. See 485 U.S. 717 (1988) at 727-728.
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sumers) or might be used to organize cartels at the retailer level. Similar
support for the cartel-facilitating effect of vertical non-price restraints was
and remains lacking”.10
The Court’s argument that “vertical price agreements” can facilitate col-
lusion by reducing the incentive of a manufacturer to cheat on a cartel by
lowering wholesale price has not been formalized and seems to rely on the
assumption that the manufacturer can undertake not to modify the retail
price set by the distributor – e.g., the contract makes the renegotiation of
retail prices more difficult or costly than that of wholesale prices.11
The present paper explores this argument in more detail and starts from
the idea that, under RPM, retail prices are centrally set by the manufacturer
and thus do not fully adjust to local variations on retail costs or demand;
as a result, retail prices are more uniform under RPM, and deviations from
a tacit agreement are thus more easily detected; it follows that RPM, while
being less efficient since it generates less flexible prices, can be adopted to
facilitate interbrand collusion.12
In our model, long-lived producers sell to short-sighted retailers. In each
period, each producer signs an exclusive contract with a retailer. Demand
is stochastic, and retailers receive private information on their demand after
contracting but before the good is delivered to the market. Retail prices, but
not wholesale prices, are observable by competitors. We derive the most prof-
itable collusive equilibrium in two cases: in the first case, vertical contracts
are restricted to franchise contracts while in the second case, producers can
moreover control the retail price (RPM). When RPM is banned, retail prices
react to retailers’ information, which makes it harder to detect a deviation
from collusive behavior. By eliminating retailers’ pricing discretion, RPM
facilitates the detection of such deviations. On the other hand, RPM rigid-
ifies retail prices and, ceteris paribus, reduces profits; it thereby raises the
short-run incentives to deviate. We characterize the situations where RPM
effectively increases collusive equilibrium profits and identify conditions un-
der which RPM reduces welfare whenever it allows firms to increase their
profits.
10485 U.S. 717 (1988) at 725-6. The argument that RPM reduces competition and
efficiency when it serves merely to sustain a retail cartel is well-known, but exclusive
territories would achieve the same aim.
11A manufacturer could otherwise ”cheat” on the cartel agreement by modifying both
the retail price and the wholesale price at the same time – RPM might actually make
such deviation more appealing, by ensuring that the cut in wholesale price is not partially
appropriated by retailers.
12Rey and Verge´ (1999) analyze this issue from a different perspective and show that,
when producers distribute their goods through the same competing distributors, RPM can
eliminate any scope for effective competition even in the absence of repeated interaction.
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While the role of the information transmitted through the observed mar-
ket outcomes is well-known since Green-Porter (1984) and Abreu-Pearce-
Stachetti (1986), to our knowledge this is the first attempt to analyze price
restrictions as facilitating practices for collusion along these lines. The clos-
est related work is the recent analysis of price rigidity by Athey-Bagwell-
Sancharico (1998), who analyze the collusive equilibria under Bertrand com-
petition between firms having private information on their cost.13 Their
model involves no vertical relationship but incomplete information. They
focus on patient firms and thus rely on a folk theorem; in this context, the
main issue is incentive compatibility on the equilibrium path: since costs are
private information, a firm can pretend it has a low cost and adopt the cor-
responding equilibrium price. It is shown that for sufficiently high discount
factors the best collusive equilibrium may involve a constant price, with no
revelation of the costs. Our result is different in several respects. In their
model, price variability is created by producers adjusting to their cost, while
in our model it is due to distributors’ behavior. The reduced form of the
game played by producers in our model is similar to a collusion game with
noisy observations in which RPM allows to reduce the noise. Second, we
do not rely on folk theorems:14 in our model sufficiently patient firms would
actually achieve cartel profits without using RPM. One can thus view the
two arguments as complementary explanations of the effect of price rigidity
on collusion.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic
model, where producers distribute their goods through retailers who face
local shocks on the demand, and defines useful benchmarks (competitive and
monopoly prices). Section 3 analyses the scope for collusion in this setup,
with and without RPM ; the following two sections then focus on two ways
in which RPM can facilitate collusion: it can help detecting deviations from
the collusive agreement (section 4) and it can also allow the firms to sustain
harsher punishments when deviations are detected (section 5). Section 6
draws the policy implications. Section 7 shows that the analysis is robust to
alternative assumptions on the nature of local shocks (retail cost uncertainty
versus demand uncertainty), while section 8 briefly discusses how it would
extend to the case where the type of contract (RPM or not) is itself not
observed by rivals. Lastly, section 9 compares RPM with alternative vertical
restraints and shows that RPM is generally in better position to help firms
to detect deviations from a collusive path.
13Athey-Bagwell (1998) explores the scope for communication in this context.
14We build on Abreu (1986) and Abreu-Pearce-Stachetti (1990).
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2 The basic model
Two manufacturers, 1 and 2, produce differentiated goods with stochastic
demand
Di(pi, pj) = d+ εi − pi + σpj, i 6= j = 1, 2,
where pi is the retail price of manufacturer i’s good and the demand shocks
ε1 and ε2 are independently and uniformly distributed on the interval [−ε¯, ε¯].
Production and retail costs are normalized to 0, and manufacturers face a
fixed cost k. Manufacturers have an infinite life-time horizon and the same
discount factor δ. In each period, each manufacturer contracts with one
retailer that lives only for one period (alternatively, manufacturers can only
commit to spot distribution contracts). All parties are risk neutral and have
a zero reservation utility level.
2.1 The stage game
At the contracting stage, the shocks ε1 and ε2 are unknown to all parties
and manufacturers have all the bargaining power. Then, εi is observed by
retailer i but not by the manufacturers nor the other retailer.
We shall contrast two situations: in the absence of RPM , each manu-
facturer i offers a franchise contract, consisting of a franchise fee Ai and a
wholesale price wi; under RPM , it can moreover set the retail price pi.
15 Re-
tail prices are publicly observed, whereas franchise fees and wholesale prices
are not. For simplicity, we will however assume that the nature of contract
(RPM or not) signed by one manufacturer is observed by its competitor at
the end of the period – it may indeed be much easier for a competitor to
observe the nature of a contract than its precise terms. We discuss in section
8 the case where the nature of the contract is not observed.
The timing of the stage game is thus as follows:
- first, each manufacturer i secretly offers a contract, of the form (Ai, wi)
or (Ai, wi, pi), to a retailer, who accepts it or not;
- second, each retailer i observes εi and, if it has accepted the contract,
sets the retail price pi (at the level chosen by the manufacturer under RPM);
- third, demands and profits are realized; each manufacturer further ob-
serves the retail prices and the nature of the contract signed by its competitor.
15We focus on ”pure” RPM contracts under which the retail price, being set by the
manufacturer, is independent of εi. Also, we rule out contracts contingent on the com-
petitor’s price, since this would introduce explicit horizontal agreements that are per se
illegal.
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2.2 Benchmarks: Static equilibrium and collusion
Suppose that the above game is played only once, and consider first the case
where manufacturers are restricted to franchise contracts. If retailer i accepts
the contract (Ai, wi) then, denoting by p
e
j the expected value of the rival’s
retail price, retailer i will set its own retail price to (using the linearity of the
profit function with respect to the rival’s price, and the independence of the
distribution of the two demand shocks)
pi = arg max
p
(p− wi)
(
d+ εi − p+ σpej
)− Ai = d+ εi + wi + σpej
2
. (1)
Denoting by pei the expected retail price of this retailer, (1) can be rewrit-
ten as
pi = p
e
i +
εi
2
, (2)
where
pei =
d+ wi + σp
e
j
2
. (3)
Therefore, given the expected retail price for the rival good, pej , by setting
the wholesale price wi at the appropriate level manufacturer i can perfectly
control the expected price of its own product, pei , but cannot control the
flexibility of this price, which always “half responds” to the shock εi. For
the sake of presentation, whenever there is no ambiguity we will say that the
manufacturer “chooses the expected retail price pei” rather than the wholesale
price wi. Note that the manufacturer can recover the retailer’s profit through
the franchise fee, so that choosing pei yields an expected profit given by
E
[(
pei +
εi
2
)(
d+ εi −
(
pei +
εi
2
)
+ σpej
)]
− k = pei
(
d− pei + σpej
)
+ v (ε¯)− k,
(4)
where
v (ε¯) ≡ ε¯
2
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denotes the variance of the retail prices.
Consider now the Nash equilibrium of this game. Since the contract
offered to a retailer is not observed by the rival, it cannot influence the
rival’s retail price. Therefore, taking as given the expected value pej of the
rival’s equilibrium retail price, producer i will choose pei so as to maximize
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(4), which is achieved for pei =
(
d+ σpej
)
/2 by setting wi to zero. This is
an illustration of a well-known principle: since the contract does not affect
the rival’s behavior, it is optimal to “sell the technology” to the retailer
by charging a wholesale price equal to marginal cost, here zero; being the
residual claimant, the retailer then sets its retail price so as to maximize the
aggregate profits of the vertical structure, which the producer can appropriate
through the franchise fee.
In equilibrium, both producers set their wholesale price to zero (w1 =
w2 = 0) and, solving (3), the expected prices p
e
1 and p
e
2 are therefore given
by
pe1 = p
e
2 = p
N ≡ d
2− σ .
Defining
pi (pi, pj) ≡ pi (d− pi + σpj)
and
Π (p) ≡ pi (p, p) = p (d− (1− σ) p) ,
each producer’s expected Nash equilibrium profit is equal to Π(pN)+v (ε¯)−k.
In what follows we assume that Nash equilibrium profits are non-negative:
k ≤ Π (pN)+ v (ε¯) .
Suppose now that the two manufacturers can collude and both jointly
determine their franchise contracts and make them publicly observed by both
retailers. For given wholesale prices w1 and w2, the retail price equilibrium
would still be governed by (1); retail prices would thus still satisfy (2) and
(3), and expected retail prices would be determined by wholesale prices:
pei =
1
2− σ
(
d+
2wi + σwj
2 + σ
)
.
The manufacturers would therefore choose expected prices pe1 and p
e
2 that
maximize
Eε1
[(
pe1 +
ε1
2
)(
d+
ε1
2
− pe1 + σpe2
)]
+ Eε2
[(
pe2 +
ε2
2
)(
d+
ε2
2
− pe2 + σpe1
)]
= pi (pe1, p
e
2) + v (ε¯) + pi (p
e
2, p
e
1) + v (ε¯) ,
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and thus such that
pe1 = p
e
2 = p
M ≡ d
2(1− σ) .
The per-producer cartel profit is thus given by Π(pM) + v (ε¯)− k.
Lastly, suppose that RPM is introduced, so that the retail price is inde-
pendent of εi: pi = p
e
i . The manufacturer can still capture all the expected
profit (not only through the franchise fee, but also through the wholesale
price, which now has no influence on the retail price) but, since the price
does no adjust to the demand shock, this expected profit is now given by
pi (pe1, p
e
2)− k instead of pi (pe1, pe2) + v (ε¯)− k. In a static context, the manu-
facturer would thus never impose RPM on the retailer. In a dynamic context,
however, RPM might be profitable if it allows the producer to sustain higher
prices. To allow for this possibility, we will assume:
Assumption Π(pN) + v (ε¯) < Π(pM).
3 Tacit Collusion
3.1 Franchise contracts
Each manufacturer i maximizes the expected value of the discounted sum of
its profits:
Πi = (1− δ)
t=∞∑
t=0
δtΠti,
where Πti = pi(pit, pjt) + v (ε¯) − k. If only franchise contracts can be used,
and since it is always optimal for a manufacturer to recover its retailer’s
profit through the franchise fee, the relevant strategies for manufacturer i,
denoted si, can be summarized by a sequence of functions sit, setting the
expected price for period t, peit, as a function of the history of observed
retail prices in the previous periods. In what follows we concentrate on fully
symmetric equilibria (FSE) in which, in any subgame, manufacturers use
the same continuation strategy: s1t = s2t. We denote by Π
F the maximal
payoff that can be obtained in such equilibrium, and by sF the corresponding
strategy. Similarly, we denote by ΠF the minimal payoff that can be obtained
and by sF the corresponding strategy.
We show in the Appendix that, given the uniformity of the noise distri-
bution, the best collusive strategy consists in sticking to a collusive expected
11
price as long as the realization of the rival’s price is consistent with this
target, and to “punish” as much as possible any detected deviation; that
is, the best collusive strategy is of the form: “agree on an expected price
pe; if the realized retail prices are compatible with this agreement (that
is, pi, pj ∈ [pe − ε¯/2, pe + ε¯/2]), then stick to pe, otherwise play sF .” If
both manufacturers follow this strategy, their expected profit is equal to
Π (pe) + v (ε¯)− k.
If a deviation was always detected with probability 1, no deviation would
be profitable if
(1− δ)
[
max
p
pi(p, pe) + v (ε¯)− k
]
+ δΠF ≤ Π (pe) + v (ε¯)− k,
or
max
p
pi (p, pe)− Π(pe) ≤ δ
1− δ [Π (p
e) + v (ε¯)− k − ΠF ] (5)
However, a small deviation (pei ∈ [pe − ε¯, pe + ε¯]) will only be detected
with probability |pe − pei | /ε¯ < 1. The expected gain from such a deviation
is thus given by
(1− δ) [pi(pei , pe)− Π(pe)]− δ
|pe − pei |
ε¯
[Π (pe) + v (ε¯)− k − ΠF ] .
In particular, a “small” deviation (pei slightly different from p
e) will not be
profitable if (since ∂pi (p, pe) /∂p = d− (2− σ)pe for p = pe):
ε¯ |d− (2− σ)pe| ≤ δ
1− δ [Π (p
e) + v (ε¯)− k − ΠF ] (6)
The two conditions (5) and (6) are actually necessary and sufficient for
the sustainability of collusion, which allows the following characterization of
the most profitable collusive strategy, conditional on sF and ΠF :
sF is of the form: “charge an expected price pF as long as all past retail
prices belong to
[
pF − ε¯/2, pF + ε¯/2], and play sF otherwise”, where pe = pF
maximizes Π(pe) subject to (5) and (6).
See Appendix.
In the absence of RPM , the most profitable collusive strategy thus con-
sists in maintaining in each period the same expected price, pF , which can
be shown to be equal to min
{
pM , p¯F
}
, where p¯F is the maximal (expected)
price satisfying (5) and (6).
Remark: Multiple locations. While we have focussed here on the case
where each manufacturer deals with one retailer, the analysis can be ex-
tended to the more realistic situation where manufacturers have retailers in
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many different locations, provided that the observation of retail prices by
the manufacturers is sufficiently costly - if manufacturers could costlessly
observe all retail prices, detecting deviations would become easier. For ex-
ample, the same analysis as above exactly applies when there are several ex
ante identical locations with independent shocks on local demands, assuming
that in each period manufacturers observe their rival’s retail price in only one
randomly selected location.16
3.2 Resale Price Maintenance
Let us now turn to the case where RPM is allowed. As long as resorting
to RPM is observed by the competitor, allowing RPM can only increase
the set of equilibria; in particular, the equilibria described above, where
manufacturers use franchise contracts and charge pF along the equilibrium
path and play sF whenever a deviation if detected for sure, are still equilibria
when RPM is allowed but not mandatory: (i) any deviation involving RPM
is detected with probability 1 and can thus be punished with the maximal
penalty; and (ii) profits from those deviations are lower than those achieved
with simple franchise contracts, since RPM makes no use of the retailer’s
information. The global incentive compatibility condition (5) then ensures
that the equilibria resist deviations involving RPM .
We now focus on whether RPM generates new equilibria with higher
prices and profits. We denote by Π¯ the maximal payoff that can be obtained
in equilibrium when RPM is allowed and by s¯ the corresponding strategy;
similarly, we denote by Π the minimal equilibrium payoff and by s the cor-
responding strategy. Allowing RPM can facilitate collusion in two ways: it
may be used in punishment paths to allow harsher punishments (Π < ΠF )
16It is optimal to punish ”everywhere” a deviation detected in one location. Hence,
denoting by ρil = min
{ |pe−peil|
ε¯ , 1
}
the probability to detect a deviation to peil in location
l by observing the retail price in that location, the overall gain from a deviation would be
of the form∑
k
[
(1− δ) [pi(peil, pe)−Π(pe)] + δ
(
1
n
× ρil
)
× n [Π (pe) + v (ε¯)− k −ΠF ]
]
=
n∑
k=1
[(1− δ) [pi(peil, pe)−Π(pe)] + δρil [Π (pe) + v (ε¯)− k −ΠF ]] ,
and no-deviation conditions are thus the same as above.
Note that observing the quantity bought by each retailer may also give the producer
additional information about retail prices. However, this information would be limited if,
in addition to local shocks, there was also an independent shock on the demand for each
product – see the last section of the Appendix for an elaboration of that point.
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and on the collusion path to allow an easier detection of deviations (so that
we may have Π¯ > ΠF even if Π = ΠF ). However, when RPM is used on
the collusion path, deviations become more attractive as they can rely on
franchise contracts to use the retailers’ information and generate an addi-
tional profit v (ε¯) compared with RPM . The following proposition provides
a partial characterization of the most profitable collusive equilibrium in which
RPM is used in equilibrium (the proof is omitted; it follows the same steps
as for Proposition 3.1 but is simpler, due to the fact that any deviation is
detected with probability 1):
The most profitable FSE strategy in which RPM is used along the equi-
librium path is of the form: “charge an expected price pRPM as long as all
past retail prices are equal to pRPM , and play s otherwise”, where pRPM
maximizes Π(pe) subject to
max
p
pi(p, pe) + v (ε¯)− Π(pe) ≤ δ
1− δ (Π(p
e)− k − Π) (7)
The most profitable collusive strategy using RPM in equilibrium thus
consists again in maintaining in each period the same expected price, pRPM ,
which can be shown to be equal to min
{
pM , p¯RPM
}
, where p¯RPM is the maxi-
mal price satisfying (7). This condition has a straightforward interpretation:
since deviations are detected with probability one and optimally punished
in the toughest way, the optimal deviation consists in maximizing current
profits (using a franchise contract, hence the term maxp pi(p, p
e)+v (ε¯)). The
short-run gain from a deviation is thus larger when RPM is used. It has to
be compared to the long-run cost of being detected which in turn is, ceteris
paribus, reduced by v(ε¯) when RPM is used (hence the term Π(pe)−k−Π).
Thus using RPM allows to evade from condition (6) (it facilitates detection)
but results in a condition that is more stringent than (5) .
We now compare the most profitable equilibria when RPM is available
and when it is not. We first focus on the enhanced detection of deviations.
4 The detection effect
To focus on the ability to detect deviations, we assume away in this section
any impact of RPM on the optimal punishments (Π = ΠF ).
17 For that
17This would be the case if the punishment path was restricted to reversal to Nash.
[Formally, the analysis of collusion sustained by reversal to Nash is identical to the one
presented in this section, setting k = Π(pN ) + v(ε¯), and reinterpreting Π(p) − k as the
difference between profits and static Nash profits.]
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purpose, we will suppose in this section that the minmax payoff (which is 0
here) can be sustained in equilibrium, even if RPM is not allowed: ΠF = 0.
This will be the case if the fixed cost is high enough:
Suppose ε¯/d < σ/(2− σ)2. For any δˆ > 0, there exists kˆ < Π(pN) + v (ε¯)
such that ΠF = 0 for all k ≥ kˆ and δ > δˆ.
See appendix.
If the minmax can be achieved in the absence of RPM , it can a fortiori
be sustained when RPM is allowed: Π = ΠF = 0 and RPM thus does
not affect punishments. RPM can therefore help collusion only if used on
the equilibrium path. Whether RPM is indeed used in the most profitable
equilibrium then depends on the comparison between the profits with RPM
at pRPM , and the profit that can be obtained using franchise contracts on
the collusive path. Since Π = ΠF , this boils down to a comparison between
Π
(
pRPM
)
and Π
(
pF
)
+ v (ε¯). [From the same arguments as above, the best
collusive equilibrium path is stationary and consists of either pF without
RPM or pRPM with RPM .]
Since pF maximizes Π (p) subject to the global and local incentive condi-
tions (5) and (6) (setting ΠF to 0), while p
RPM maximizes Π (p) subject to
(7) (setting Π to 0), which is clearly more stringent than (5), it follows that
RPM can benefit collusion only if pF is limited by the local incentive condi-
tion (6), since otherwise pRPM ≤ pF . Furthermore, pRPM must be sufficiently
higher than pF to ensure that the increase in expected price outweighs the
cost of limiting the retailers’ price flexibility. In particular, it must be the
case that Π
(
pF
)
+ v (ε¯) < Π
(
pM
)
(otherwise RPM cannot be profitable),
which supposes that the discount factor is not too large (since pF = pM for δ
close to 1). Moreover, pRPM must belong to (qF , pM ], where qF denotes the
price between pF and pM such that Π
(
qF
)
= Π
(
pF
)
+ v (ε¯), which supposes
that the discount factor is not too small (otherwise, both pF and pRPM will
be close to pN). The following Proposition shows that, if the noise is not too
important, there exist a range of discount factors where RPM is indeed part
of the most profitable collusive strategy:
If Π = ΠF = 0 then, for ε¯/d small enough there exists δ and δ¯ > δ such
that s¯ necessarily involves RPM on the equilibrium path for δ < δ < δ¯.18
See appendix.
Propositions 4 and 4 ensure that the above analysis is meaningful. We
show in the Appendix that they are jointly compatible: there is an open
18The only assumption needed for this result is the fact that δ1−δ
(
Π¯−Π) increases with
δ, which is trivially the case when Π = ΠF = 0 but is likely to be true in many if not most
other cases. [If Π 6= ΠF , however, the relevant price “pF ” is the best price that can be
sustained without RPM on the equilibrium path, using Π (and thus, possibly, RPM) for
punishment.]
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range of parameters (ε¯, d, k, δ) for which ΠF = 0 but the most profitable
collusive strategy s¯ uses RPM in equilibrium; in that range of parameters,
allowing RPM does not enhance the punishments that can be used to deter
deviations but leads to an increase of the most profitable collusive price.
5 The effect on punishment
We now turn to the effect of RPM on punishments. As pointed out above,
when adopting RPM is observed by the rival manufacturer, the equilibria
derived in the absence of RPM still constitute equilibria when RPM is
allowed; therefore, the optimal punishment can only decrease when RPM is
allowed
(
Π ≤ ΠF ). Furthermore, whenever Π < ΠF and pF < pM , allowing
RPM raises the most profitable equilibrium price –even if RPM is not used
on the equilibrium path– since it relaxes both the local and global incentive
compatibility. The following proposition establishes that this is indeed the
case when there is not too much noise:
For ε¯/d small enough, there exists k and δ such that ΠF > 0 = Π.
See appendix.
Another case of interest is when a “no-dumping” condition is imposed on
the wholesale tariff, that is, when the wholesale price cannot be set below
the marginal cost (normalized here to zero):
w ≥ 0.
Then, since the static Nash equilibrium is precisely obtained for wholesale
prices equal to marginal cost, in the absence of RPM no equilibrium price
can be lower than pN and thus the static Nash equilibrium constitutes the
less profitable equilibrium:
ΠF = Π(p
N) + v (ε¯)− k > 0.
In contrast, RPM opens the possibility to impose retail prices in
[
0, pN
]
,
at least for some period of time, and it is easy to show that it is possible to
sustain a profit (at least slightly) lower than Π(pN) + v (ε¯) − k;19 allowing
RPM therefore raises the most profitable collusive price even though it may
not be used on the equilibrium path.
19For example, the equilibrium s used to support Π = 0 in proposition 5 does not rely
on wholesale prices below the marginal cost.
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6 Welfare analysis
In this section we analyze the welfare implications of allowing RPM , assum-
ing that manufacturers coordinate on the best collusive FSE.
If RPM is banned, producers coordinate on the price pF . If the only
effect of RPM is to reduce the punishment profit (Π < ΠF but s¯ does not
use RPM along the equilibrium path), allowing RPM simply increases the
expected price and thus is detrimental. When RPM is used in equilibrium,
its impact is a priori more ambiguous, since consumers prefer prices that do
not react to demand fluctuations.
A measure of welfare is the total surplus W (p1, p2; ε1, ε2), sum of the
consumer surplus, denoted S (p1, p2; ε1, ε2), and total profit. Using ∂S/∂pi =
−Di and pii = piDi, we have:
∂W
∂pi
(p1, p2; ε1, ε2) =
(
∂S
∂pi
+
∂pii
∂pi
+
∂pij
∂pi
)
(p1, p2; ε1, ε2)
= − (d+ εi − pi + σpj) + (d+ εi − 2pi + σpj) + (σpj)
= −pi + σpj.
Integrating, the total surplus is given by:
W (p1, p2; ε1, ε2) = C (ε1, ε2)− 1
2
(
p21 + p
2
2 − 2σp1p2
)
.
If the two prices have the same expected value pe, the expected total
surplus is thus:
W e = Ce − (1− σ) (pe)2 − 1
2
(V ar [p1] + V ar [p2]) .
Therefore, for a given expected price pe, RPM increases total surplus.
However, there is a real conflict between firms’ interest and consumer or
total welfare: consumers like stable prices whereas firms prefer to let them
react to demand conditions. Therefore, while RPM has potentially a positive
effect on consumer surplus due to the stabilization of prices, manufacturers
will adopt RPM only if it leads to an increase of prices large enough to
compensate them. The following proposition shows that this is precisely the
case where it harms welfare –and a fortiori consumer surplus– when the scope
for collusion is substantial; in that case, banning RPM is socially optimal:
When either pF ≥ pM/2 or pRPM > pM − pN , allowing RPM can only
reduce welfare.
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Suppose first that ΠF = Π. Then RPM is used in equilibrium if
Π
(
pRPM
)− Π (pF ) = (1− σ) (pRPM − pF ) [2pM − (pRPM + pF )] > v (ε¯) .
(8)
Since V ar [pi] = v (ε¯) under franchise contracts, total welfare decreases
when RPM is allowed if
(1− σ) (pRPM)2 > (1− σ) (pF )2 + v (ε¯) ,
or:
(1− σ) (pRPM − pF ) (pRPM + pF ) > v (ε¯) . (9)
It is immediate that (8) implies (9) if
pRPM + pF ≥ pM
This is clearly true if pRPM > pM − pN , because pF > pN . This is also
true when pF > pM/2, since (8) implies pRPM > pF .
If ΠF > Π, the effect is reinforced. The best price with franchise is pˆ
F >
pF so that welfare is reduced if along the equilibrium path s¯ involves franchise
contracts with pˆF or RPM contracts with pRPM and pˆF + pRPM > pM .
Note that σ < 2/3 implies pN > pM/2 and thus pF ≥ pM/2; hence:
If σ < 2/3, allowing RPM can only reduce total welfare.
7 Retail cost uncertainty
While we have focused on shocks on the demand side, a similar analysis
can be conducted when the shocks affect retail costs. The general point is
that retailers’ prices tend to respond to variations in both the demand they
face and their (marginal) costs. RPM prevents adjustments to such local
variations and thus facilitates the detection of deviations in producers’ tariffs.
To see that, assume that demand is not stochastic, Di(pi, pj) = d−pi+σpj,
but retail cost is. We normalize the average retail costs to zero so that the
retail cost of retailer i is εi, uniformly distributed on the interval [−ε¯, ε¯]. The
timing of information is the same as before, in particular contracts are signed
before the retailer observes its cost.
Given a wholesale price wi the retailer sets a price
pi = arg max
p
(p− wi − εi)
(
d− p+ σpej
)− Ai. (10)
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It follows that in the absence of RPM the retail price is still of the form
pi = p
e
i +
εi
2
,
where
pei =
d+ wi + σp
e
j
2
as before. The expected profit is then pi(pei , p
e
j) + v (ε¯), as with demand
uncertainty.
The analysis of the equilibrium strategies conducted for the case of de-
mand uncertainty carries over to the case of cost uncertainty; since the set of
equilibria depends only on the “reduced” profit function and the relationship
between the producers’ strategy and the observed retail prices, pi = p
e
i +εi/2.
Therefore, all the results up to Proposition 7 remain valid for the case where
εi is interpreted as a shock on retailer i’s marginal cost.
The main difference concerns welfare effects, as it is socially beneficial to
let retail prices react to the shocks on the costs. Using pii = (pi − εi)Di, the
same derivation as before shows that, for a common expected price pe, the
expected total surplus is given by:
W e = C − (1− σ) (pe)2 − 1
2
(V ar [p1 − ε1] + V ar [p2 − ε2]) ,
where C is a constant. Hence, RPM should clearly be banned since it has
only negative effects on welfare; it increases the best collusive expected price
and moreover prevents prices from adjusting to retail costs:
With no demand uncertainty and retail cost uncertainty, allowing RPM
can only reduce welfare.
8 Unobserved contracts
We have assumed so far that the type of contract (franchise or RPM) was
observable to all parties. We now discuss the case of secret contracts. We
assume here that ΠF = Π = 0, which holds true if k is close to Π(p
N) +v (ε¯).
The fact that contracts are secret does not affect the maximal price pRPM
that can be sustained when RPM is used in equilibrium but may affect the
most profitable strategy based on franchise contracts, since secretly switching
to RPM creates a new possibility of deviation. For example, starting from
a franchise contract with pF , a firm can impose RPM and a retail price p
between pF − ε¯/2 and pF : it will lose v (ε¯) but will not be detected by the
rival since the price remains in the admissible range.
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The price pF and strategy sF previously characterized still form an equi-
librium if
max
0≤x≤ ε¯
2
{pi(pF − x, pF )− Π(pF )− v (ε¯)} ≤ 0,
or
max
0≤x≤ ε¯
2
{((2− σ)pF − d)) x− x2} ≤ v (ε¯) .
Straightforward computations show that this is possible only if
pF ≤ pN + ε¯
(2− σ)√3 . (11)
This is the case if ε¯ is large or δ is small, since in both instances pF is small.
The non observability of contracts then does not affect the equilibrium.
If condition (11) is not satisfied, the price pF can no longer be sustained
when contracts are secret and RPM is allowed. In this case, allowing RPM
has two opposite effects. It reduces the most profitable collusive price based
on franchise contracts to a lower price pˆF < pF , which increases welfare,
but manufacturers may then prefer to resort to RPM and implement pRPM ,
which, for levels of prices that are not too small, reduces welfare.20
9 Comparison with other vertical arrangements
Other vertical restraints than RPM may affect the variability of retail prices
and, therefore, the scope for collusion; it is thus interesting to compare RPM
with those other arrangements in the light of the above analysis.
9.1 Intrabrand competition
As a benchmark, consider first the case where manufacturers promote strong
intrabrand competition among their retailers. Assuming pure Bertrand com-
petition, retail prices would then respond 100% to changes in retail costs and
not at all to changes in demand. Therefore, promoting intrabrand competi-
tion does not facilitate the detection of producers’ deviations from a collusive
path when there are shocks on retail costs. Furthermore, even in the case
of demand shocks, promoting intrabrand competition does not facilitate the
20However, it can be shown that even with secret contracts there exists an open range
of parameters under which allowing RPM reduces welfare.
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detection of deviations as effectively as RPM whenever retailers are not per-
fect competitors (e.g., because of differentiation) or marginal costs are not
constant (with decreasing returns to scale, variations in the size of demand
would affect retail prices).
9.2 Exclusive territories
Granting exclusive territories reduces intrabrand competition and tends to
give retailers more freedom in the setting of their prices. Therefore, exclusive
territories tend to increase the variability of retail prices in the presence
of local shocks on consumer demand. For example, in the linear model,
retail prices half respond to changes in the size of demand if retailers are
granted exclusive territories, whereas they do not respond at all to such
changes if, in each location, there is head-to-head competition between rival
retailers. Therefore, exclusive territories tend to make producers’ deviations
more difficult to detect when there are local shocks on consumer demand.
Retail prices always respond to local shocks on retail costs, however,
whether retailers benefit from exclusive territories or not. For example, in the
linear model, retail prices half respond to variations in retail (marginal) costs
if retailers are granted exclusive territories, whereas they fully respond to
such changes if there is perfect intrabrand competition. Therefore, exclusive
territories tend to reduce the variability of retail prices, but not to the same
extent as RPM , which therefore still facilitates the detection of producers’
deviations from a collusive path.
9.3 Quotas
Quantity quotas, even in the form of quantity floors or ceilings, contribute
to increase the variability of retail prices when there are local shocks on
consumer demand. For example, assume that producer i imposes a minimal
quota q and a maximal quota q ≥ q in the above linear model (a fixed quota
would correspond to the case q = q). Given the rival’s expected retail price
pej , retailer i will then set a price pi given by
pi = d+ εi + σp
e
j − q if d+ εi + σpej + wi > 2q,
=
d+ εi + σp
e
j + wi
2
if 2q > d+ εi + σp
e
j + wi > 2q,
= d+ εi + σp
e
j − q if d+ εi + σpej + wi < 2q.
That is, the retail price only half responds to changes in the demand
size di (dpi/dεi = 1/2) when quotas are not binding, but respond fully to
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such changes (dpi/dεi = 1) when quotas are binding, which exacerbates their
variability (for instance, the introduction of a fixed quota doubles the range
of retail prices).21
9.4 Nonlinear tariffs
Nonlinear wholesale tariffs might also reduce the variability of retail prices.
Of course, nonlinear tariffs may involve transaction costs that reduce their
appeal. But retailers’ arbitrage, too, limits their effectiveness in reducing
retail price variability. To see this in the simplest way, we briefly show here
that retailers’ arbitrage limits a monopolistic producer’s ability to reduce the
variability of a retailer’s price through nonlinear wholesale tariffs; we show
formally in the last section of the Appendix that the insights carry over to
the duopoly context analyzed above.
Consider a monopolist producer dealing with n retailers, each of them a lo-
cal monopolist bearing no retail cost and facing a linear demand Di (εi, pi) =
d+εi−pi, where local shocks εi are independently and identically distributed.
The intuition is that if retailers coordinate their supply decisions, the pro-
ducer cannot hope to control each retailer’s individual price but only an
“average” price; as a result, the producer cannot prevent individual prices
from at least partially responding to demand fluctuations. Furthermore, as
the number of retailers increases, the producer will loose more and more con-
trol over the distribution of retail prices and, in the limit (for a very large
number of retailers), it cannot do better than with simple two-part tariffs.
Assuming that retailers can perfectly coordinate their buying decisions,
if the producer offers nonlinear tariffs (tk (qk))k=1,...,n and retailers want to
buy a total quantity Q, they will buy (q¯k)k=1,...,n solution to
min
(qk)k=1,...,n
∑
k tk (qk)
s.t.
∑
k qk = Q
and then redistribute quantities and share the total payment to the producer,
t¯ (Q) ≡∑k tk (q¯k), so as to ensure that each of them gains from participating
in this arbitrage.22 Therefore, for a given realization of the shocks (εk)k=1,..,n,
the retailers will choose to sell quantities qˆk solution to
max
(qk)k=1,...,n
∑
k
(d+ εk − qk) qk − t¯
(∑
k
qk
)
21In the case of shocks on retail costs, however, a minimal quota is formally equivalent
to a price ceiling whereas a maximal quota is equivalent to a price floor.
22The precise transfers are not relevant for the present analysis, so long as retailers can
reach an agreement and agree on the payment-minimizing allocation q¯ik.
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and characterized (assuming an interior solution) by23
qˆk =
d+ εk − t¯′ (
∑
k qˆk)
2
, k = 1, ..., n. (12)
Adding-up those conditions shows that the total quantity Qˆ ≡ ∑k qˆk is
solution to
Qˆ =
nd+
∑
k εk − nt¯′
(
Qˆ
)
2
,
so that the total quantity Qˆ is a function of the local shocks only through
their sum
∑
k εk. Building on this observation, conditions (12) yield
pˆk = d+ εk − qˆk =
d+ εk + t¯
′
(
Qˆ (kεk)
)
2
. (13)
Therefore, even if the producer could design at will the function f (ε) ≡
t¯′
(
Qˆ (ε)
)
, the variance of retail price p1, say, would be of the form
V ar
(
ε1
2
+
f (kεk)
2
)
=
1
4
V ar (ε1 + f (kεk)) .
This variance is minimized for f (
∑
k εk) = −E [ε1 |
∑
k εk ] (proof in Ap-
pendix) and is then equal to
1
4
{V ar [ε1]− V ar [E [ε1 |kεk ]]} .
This minimal variance increases with the number of retailers n: the ag-
gregate shock
∑
k εk provides less and less information on any particular
individual shock εi when the number of location increases, so that the sec-
ond term in the above expression decreases when n increases. In the limit (n
very large) the aggregate shock provides no information at all on any indi-
vidual shock; the second term thus disappears (E [ε1 |
∑
k εk ] = E [ε1] and its
variance is zero) and the minimal variance is thus equal to V ar [ε1] /4, which
is the variance of retail prices generated by two-part tariffs.
Therefore, as the number of retailers increases, the producer is less and
less able to reduce the variability of a retailer’s price through nonlinear tariffs.
When the number of retailers is large, nonlinear tariffs cannot help reduce
23We use a differentiable approach for conciseness, but the argument is valid for any
mechanism.
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a retail price variability, as compared with simple two-part tariffs. Further-
more, even if the number of retailers is limited, nonlinear tariffs improve
over two-part tariffs but can never be as efficient as RPM in reducing retail
price volatility whenever there are at least two retailers (for n = 2, the above
minimal variance is V ar [ε1] /8 > 0).
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A Proof of Proposition 3.1
If the expected price is equal to pe at some point on an equilibrium path,
then the following strategy is an equilibrium strategy:
“charge the expected price pe, and then play sF if the realized prices
belong to [pe − ε¯
2
, pe + ε¯
2
]2, and sF otherwise.”
Consider an equilibrium and an history along the equilibrium path leading
to the expected price pe, and let V (p1, p2) be the continuation value of the
game at this date, as a function of the realized prices. Then
pe ∈ arg max
p
{
(1− δ) [pi(p, pe) + v (ε¯)− k] + δE
[
V (p+
ε1
2
, pe +
ε2
2
)
]}
,
where ΠF ≤ V ≤ ΠF .
We now show that manufacturers have no incentive to deviate from the
candidate equilibrium described above. Manufacturers’ candidate equilib-
rium payoff is
(1− δ) [Π(pe) + v (ε¯)− k] + δΠF ≥ (1− δ) [Π(pe) + v (ε¯)− k] + δE
[
V (p+
ε1
2
, p+
ε2
2
)
]
.
The payoff of deviating and charging p /∈ [pe − ε¯, pe + ε¯] is instead given
by
(1− δ) [pi(p, pe) + v (ε¯)− k] + δΠF ≤ (1− δ) [pi(p, pe) + v (ε¯)− k] + δE
[
V (p+
ε1
2
, pe +
ε2
2
)
]
,
and is thus smaller than in the original equilibrium; therefore, this deviation
is not profitable. The payoff of a deviation to p ∈]pe − ε¯, pe[ is given by
(1− δ) [pi(p, pe) + v (ε¯)− k] + δΠF + δ (p
e − p)
ε¯
(ΠF − ΠF ).
But, since the distribution of the demand shock is uniform and ΠF ≤
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V ≤ ΠF :
E
[
V (p+
ε1
2
, pe +
ε2
2
)
]
− E
[
V (pe +
ε1
2
, pe +
ε2
2
)
]
=
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
[
V (p+
ε1
2
, pe +
ε2
2
)− V (pe + ε1
2
, pe +
ε2
2
)
] dε1dε2
4ε¯2
=
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
[∫ p+ ε¯
2
p− ε¯
2
V (x, pe +
ε2
2
)
dx
ε¯
−
∫ pe+ ε¯
2
pe− ε¯
2
V (x, pe +
ε2
2
)
dx
ε¯
]
dε2
2ε¯
=
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
[∫ pe− ε¯
2
p− ε¯
2
V (x, pe +
ε2
2
)
dx
ε¯
−
∫ pe+ ε¯
2
p+ ε¯
2
V (x, pe +
ε2
2
)
dx
ε¯
]
dε2
2ε¯
≥
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
[∫ pe− ε¯
2
p− ε¯
2
ΠF
dx
ε¯
−
∫ pe+ ε¯
2
p+ ε¯
2
ΠF
dx
ε¯
]
dε2
2ε¯
=
pe − p
ε¯
(
ΠF − ΠF
)
.
Therefore, the payoff generated by a deviation to p ∈]pe − ε¯, pe[ is again
smaller in the new candidate equilibrium then in the original equilibrium, and
the deviation is thus not profitable. A similar reasoning holds for p > pe.
The set of expected prices pe that can be sustained at some point on an
equilibrium path is a closed interval IF , which is the set of prices satisfying
both
max
p
pi (p, pe)− Π(pe) ≤ δ
1− δ
(
ΠF − ΠF
)
(14)
and
ε¯ |d− (2− σ)pe| ≤ δ
1− δ
(
ΠF − ΠF
)
. (15)
If the expected price pe is sustained at some point in an equilibrium, then
the strategy described in the previous lemma must form a FSE, and thus
max
p
{(1− δ) [pi(p, pe)− Π(pe)]− δ inf{|p
e − p|
ε¯
, 1}(ΠF − ΠF )} ≤ 0. (16)
Conversely, if this condition is satisfied for a given pe, then the strategy de-
scribed in the previous lemma indeed form a FSE, in which in the first period
the expected price is pe. Therefore an expected price pe can be sustained at
some point in a FSE if and only if it satisfies (16).
This condition clearly implies both (14) and (15): (15) is the local version
of (16) (for prices p slightly different from pe) while (14) involves a (weakly)
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larger probability of detection than (16) and a deviation that is profitable
when detected with probability 1 would a fortiori remain profitable for a
smaller probability of detection. We now show that, together, (14) and (15)
imply (16). Suppose this was not the case. This implies that the optimal
deviation involves a price p insufficiently different from pe for being detected
with probability 1 (p ∈ [pe − ε¯, pe + ε¯]), otherwise (14) would be violated. If
for example this price p is below pe, then
pi(p, pe)− Π(pe)− δ
1− δ
pe − p
ε¯
(ΠF − ΠF ) > 0.
But the function that appears in the left-hand side is concave in p and
equal to 0 for p = pe; therefore, its slope is necessarily negative for p = pe,
which violates (15). The argument is similar if the optimal deviation price p
is above pe.
Lastly, since both the left-hand sides of (14) and (15) are convex in pe,
the set of prices satisfying both constraints is an interval.
Defining
pˆF = arg max
p∈IF
Π(p),
we can now prove Proposition 3.1. First, by definition of pˆF , we have ΠF ≤
Π
(
pˆF
)
+v (ε¯)−k. Moreover, since the strategy described in the above lemma
generates a FSE, we have
ΠF ≥ (1− δ) [Π (pˆF )+ v (ε¯)− k]+ δΠF .
Therefore ΠF = Π
(
pˆF
)
+v (ε¯)−k, which is possible only if pˆF is played with
probability one at all dates. Furthermore, pe = pˆF satisfies (14) and (15) with
ΠF = Π
(
pˆF
)
+ v (ε¯)− k, and thus also satisfies (5) and (6). The conclusion(
pˆF = pF
)
follows from the fact that, conversely, any price satisfying (5) and
(6) belongs to IF . To see that, it suffices to note that (5) and (6) imply (the
argument is similar to that given above for the equivalence of (16) with (14)
and (15))
max
p
{(1− δ) [pi(p, pe)− Π(pe)]− δ inf{|p
e − p|
ε¯
, 1}(Π (pe) + v (ε¯)− k − ΠF )} ≤ 0,
(17)
which in turn implies that adopting the strategy “charge the expected price
pe as long as the realized prices belong to [pe − ε¯/2, pe + ε¯/2]2, and play sF
otherwise” constitutes an equilibrium.
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B Proof of proposition 4
Let ΠF0 (δ) be the maximal profit that can be sustained assuming that ΠF =
0, and denote by sF0 (δ) and p
F
0 (δ) the corresponding strategy and collusive
expected price. For any given δ, pF0 (δ) is at least as high as the price that
can be supported by a reversal to Nash, which itself is strictly above pN for
δ > 0.
Choose p such that
max
{
∆
(
p
)
, ε¯
[
d− (2− σ)p]+ Π (p)}+ v (ε¯)− k = 0, (18)
where
∆ (p) ≡ max
q
pi (q, p) =
(d+ σp)2
4
.
The assumption ε¯/d < σ/(2 − σ)2 ensures that ε¯ [d− (2− σ)p] + Π (p)
increases in p for p ≤ pN ; since ∆ (p) also increases in p and ∆ (pN) = Π (pN):
• The price p increases with k and goes up to pN as k increases up to
Π
(
pN
)
+ v (ε¯).
• For any δˆ there exists kˆ such that, for any δ ≥ δˆ and k ∈
[
kˆ,Π
(
pN
)
+ v (ε¯)
]
the price p characterized by (18) is well-defined and satisfies:24
δΠF0 (δ) + (1− δ)
(
Π
(
p
)
+ v (ε¯)− k) > 0. (19)
To show that ΠF = 0, we use the following punishment path:
pPt = p for t = 0, ..., T − 1,
pPt = pˆ for t = T,
pPt = p
F
0 (δ) for t > T,
where T ≥ 1 and pˆ ∈ [p, pF0 (δ)] are chosen so that
(1− δ)
T∑
t=0
δt
[
Π
(
p
)
+ v (ε¯)− k]+ (1− δ) δT [Π (pˆ) + v (ε¯)− k] + δT+1ΠF0 (δ) = 0.
24Note that pF0 (δ) is a non decreasing function of δ. Therefore, if (19) is satisfied for
δ = δˆ, it is satisfied for any δ > δˆ. And for any δˆ, (19) is satisfied for k = Π
(
pN
)
+ v(ε¯)
(since then p = pN and pF0 (δ) > p
N ), so that there exists kˆ such that (19) remains satisfied
(for δ = δˆ) for any k ≥ kˆ.
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Such T and pˆ always exist from (19). Assuming that deviations from
this punishment path (realized prices (pt1, pt2) outside the appropriate range
[pPt − ε¯/2, pPt + ε¯/2]2) are themselves punished by returning to the beginning
of the punishment path, we now show that no such deviations are profitable.
As usual, it suffices to consider one-period deviations and, moreover, since by
construction deviations are ruled out in periods t > T , we restrict attention
to the first T + 1 periods.
By sticking to the above strategy, in each period τ < T, a manufacturer’s
expected profit is given by
Πτ = (1− δ)
T−1∑
t=τ
δt−τ
[
Π
(
p
)
+ v (ε¯)− k]
+ (1− δ) δT−τ [Π (pˆ) + v (ε¯)− k] + δT−τ+1ΠF0 (δ) .
By deviating in one of the first T periods, a manufacturer thus gets at
most
max
p
{
(1− δ) [pi(p, p)− Π(p)]− δ inf{ ∣∣p− p∣∣
ε¯
, 1}(Πτ+1 − Π0)
}
.
Since Πτ increases with τ , the bigger gain from deviation is achieved
for τ = 0; using the fact that δ(Π1 − Π0) = (1 − δ)(Π
(
p
)
+ v (ε¯) − k) by
construction, there is thus no profitable deviation in the first T periods if
and only if
max
p
{
pi(p, p)− Π(p) + inf{
∣∣p− p∣∣
ε¯
, 1} [Π (p)+ v (ε¯)− k]} ≤ 0. (20)
This condition is satisfied under (18). First note that if this was not the
case, the optimal deviation would involve a price p insufficiently different
from p for being detected with probability 1
(
p ∈ [p− ε¯, p+ ε¯]), since the
optimal deviation would otherwise be q = arg maxp pi(p, p) and would thus
imply ∆
(
p
)
+ v (ε¯) − k > 0, contradicting (18). Therefore, suppose there
exists a price p below p
(
p ∈ [p− ε¯, p]) such that
pi(p, p)− Π(p) +
∣∣p− p∣∣
ε¯
[
Π
(
p
)
+ v (ε¯)− k] > 0.
Since the left-hand side is concave in p and equal to 0 for p = p, its slope
is necessarily negative for p = p, implying
ε¯
[
d− (2− σ)p]+ Π (p)+ v (ε¯)− k > 0,
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in contradiction with (18). A similar argument holds if the optimal deviation
price p is above p.
Lastly, note that (18) and (19) imply that p satisfies both (14) and (15)
(with ΠF = 0), and thus belongs to I
F . Therefore, pˆ ∈ [p, pF0 (δ)] also
belongs to IF and, from the proof of Proof of Proposition 3.1, there is no
profitable deviation from the punishment path in period T .
C Proof of proposition 4
The same argument as before can be used to show that, along the equilibrium
path generated by the best collusive strategy s¯, the same price is charged in
each period. Since Π = ΠF , the equilibrium path is thus either of the form
“charge an expected price pF without RPM in each period”, which yields
Π(pF ) + v (ε¯)− k, or “charge pRPM with RPM in each period”, which yields
Π(pRPM)− k.
We will use the following lemma:
Fix ε¯ and, for any price p ∈ [pN , pM] such that Π (p) < Π (pM) − v (ε¯),
define q (p) as the lower solution to
Π(q) = Π(p) + v (ε¯) (21)
and
φ (p) ≡ ε¯((2− σ)p− d)−
(
(2− σ) q (p)− d
2
)2
− v (ε¯) . (22)
Then, if maxpN<p<pM φ (p) > 0, there exists a range of values of the discount
factor for which RPM is necessarily used along the equilibrium path of the
best collusive FSE.
For any price p ∈ [pN , pM] such that Π (p) < Π (pM)− v (ε¯), define δ (p)
as the unique solution to
ε¯ [(2− σ)p− d] = δ
1− δ [Π (p) + v (ε¯)− k] . (23)
We first show that if φ (p) > 0 for a price p ∈ [pN , pM], then RPM is
necessarily used along the equilibrium path of the best collusive FSE when
δ = δ (p). Note first that for δ = δ (p), pF ≤ p since by construction (6)
is binding at p. Second, (23) and φ (p) > 0 imply (using ∆(p) − Π(p) =
( (2−σ)p−d
2
)2)
∆(q (p)) + v (ε¯)− Π(q (p)) < δ
1− δ [Π (p) + v (ε¯)− k]
=
δ
1− δ [Π (q (p))− k] ,
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and thus q (p) satisfies (7). Therefore, a price slightly above q (p) is feasible
with RPM and more profitable than p (and thus pF )25 without RPM .
To complete the proof, it suffices to note that δ (p) is increasing in p.
Therefore, whenever maxpN<p<pM φ (p) > 0, there exists a range of values p
for which φ (p) > 0 (φ is concave, so that this range is actually an interval)
and, therefore, a range of values of the discount factor for which RPM is
necessarily used along the best collusive equilibrium path.
It is straightforward to check that the function φ (p) is concave and reaches
its maximum for p characterized by the first-order condition:
pM − p = 2ε¯
2− σ
pM − q (p)
q (p)− pN . (24)
We now show that when ε¯/d is small enough, the price p ∈ [pN , pM]
defined by (24) satisfies φ (p) > 0. Defining η = ε¯/d and x, y, λ and µ by
p = xpN + (1− x)pM ,
q (p) = ypN + (1− y)pM ,
λ =
σ
2(1− σ) ,
µ =
2− σ
σ
√
1− σ
3
,
conditions (21) and (24) become
x2 = y2 + µη2, (25)
2η = λ (1− y) x
y
, (26)
Conditions (25) and (26) define x and y as a function of η, and, combined
together, yield
2η = λ (1− y)
√
1 + µ
η2
y2
.
Since the right-hand side of this equation is a decreasing function of y for
y > 0 and equals 0 for y = 1, there is a one-to-one relationship between η
25We already show that pF ≤ p, which is sufficient to conclude; the fact that (7) is
satisfied at q (p) however implies that the weaker constraint (5) is also satisfied at q (p)
and thus at p < q (p). Therefore, pF = p.
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and y, and y tends to 1 as η tends to 0. Condition (25) then also implies
that x tends to 1 as η gets to 0 and, moreover, the first-order approximation
yields, for η small:
x ∼ y ∼ 1− 2
λ
η.
Finally, for x and y satisfying (25) and (26), φ (p) can be written as(
λ
1− x
η
+ µ
η2
x2
− 13
12
)
ε¯2,
and
lim
η→0
(
λ
1− x
η
+ µ
η2
x2
− 13
12
)
=
11
12
> 0.
Therefore, for η = ε¯/d small enough, there exist x and y, solution to (25)
and (26), which satisfy 0 < x < y < 1 and for which φ > 0.
The final point is to show that the analysis is compatible with the as-
sumption ΠF = 0. To see this, notice that the interval of prices p such that
φ(p) > 0 is independent of δ and k. Let us fix all parameters except these two
and choose a price p in the relevant interval. Then (23) defines an increasing
relationship between k and δ. As k converges to Π(pN) + v (ε¯), δ converges
to some positive limit. Choose δˆ strictly smaller than this limit, and let kˆ
be the corresponding fixed cost defined in proposition (4) . Then for k high
enough, δ defined by (23) is larger than δˆ while k > kˆ. Thus ΠF = 0 and
RPM is used in equilibrium.
D Proof of Proposition 5
As before let ΠF0 (δ) be the maximal profit that could be sustained if ΠF = 0.
When ε¯/d is small enough, there exists p˜ and p such that p < p˜ < pN and
Π(p˜) = ∆(p), (27)
and
ε¯ [d− (2− σ)p˜] > ∆(p) + v (ε¯)− Π(p). (28)
Consider the following system:
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Π(p˜) = ∆(p), (29)
ε¯
2
[d− (2− σ)p˜] = ∆(p)− Π(p). (30)
Equation (29) defines p as an increasing function of p˜ with p = pN at
p˜ = pN and
dp
dp˜
|p˜=pN= 1.
Equation (30) defines in turn p˜ as a function of ε¯, with value pN at
ε¯ = 0 and
dp˜
dε¯
|ε¯=0= − 2
2− σ .
Choose then ε¯ small26 and p˜ and p defined by (29) and (30). Then
p < p˜ < pN and
ε¯
2
[d− (2− σ)p˜] ∼ ε¯2 > v (ε¯) = ε¯
2
12
.
Therefore
ε¯ [d− (2− σ)p˜]− v (ε¯) > ε¯
2
[d− (2− σ)p˜] = ∆(p)− Π(p).
Suppose now that ε¯/d is indeed “small”, and fix δ and k such that, for p
and p˜ defined as in the above lemma,
Π(p˜) + v (ε¯)− k = ∆(p) + v (ε¯)− k = 0,
δ
1− δΠ
F
0 (δ) = ∆(p) + v (ε¯)− Π(p) < ε¯ [d− (2− σ)p˜] .
Consider first the case without RPM and suppose that ΠF = 0. Then
the maximal profit is ΠF0 (δ) . But since by construction ε¯ [d− (2− σ)p˜] >
δ
1−δ
[
ΠF0 (δ)− 0
]
, p˜ /∈ IF ; similarly, for any price p further away from pN ,
ε¯ |d− (2− σ)p| = ε¯(2− σ) ∣∣pN − p∣∣ > (2− σ)ε¯ ∣∣pN − p˜∣∣ > δ
1− δΠ
F
0 (δ) ,
26While we show here that for any given d a solution exists for ε¯ ”small enough”, it
should be clear that the same argument applies whenever ε¯/d is ”small’ (p˜/d and p/d are
the relevant variables).
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and thus p /∈ IF . Therefore, all prices in IF are closer to pN than p˜ and thus
generate a strictly positive profit.27 This implies
ΠF ≥ inf
p∈IF
{Π(p) + v (ε¯)− k} > 0,
a contradiction.
We now turn to the case where RPM is allowed and consider the following
equilibrium: play p with RPM for one period, then play sF ; start again if a
deviation occurs. The profit is
(1− δ) [Π(p)− k]+ δΠF0 (δ) = 0.
The incentive compatibility condition is then
∆(p) + v (ε¯)− Π(p) ≤ δ
1− δΠ
F
0 (δ) ,
which is trivially verified. Therefore Π = 0 is an equilibrium profit as well as
ΠF0 (δ) .
E Nonlinear tariffs and retailers’ arbitrage
We now assume that there are n locations k = 1, ..., n, in which each pro-
ducer i = 1, 2 has a single retailer facing a local shock εik on demand. The
framework is the same as in the core model, except that: i) each producer
i can offer each retailer k a menu of nonlinear tariffs Tik; ii) retailers can
coordinate on quantity exchanges, transfers and retail prices so as to take
advantage of any arbitrage opportunity offered by wholesale tariffs; iii) there
is a common shock on the demand faced by all retailers of a given product.
The demand of a retailer is then
di + εik − pik + σpjk
where di and εik are independent, with respective means d and 0 (εik and
εik′ can be correlated). For the sake of tractability, we will assume that
all retailers of a same producer i share the information regarding the local
shocks εi = (εik)k=1,...,n when deciding on inter-retailer trade and prices,
but none of them observes the aggregate shock di at this stage.
28 Then,
27By construction, Π(p˜) + v(ε¯)− k = 0; the conclusion follows from the fact that Π (p)
is quadratic and reaches its peak for a price p higher than pN .
28The reason for introducing an aggregate shock on demand is to limit the information
contained in quantities, see below.
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given the menus Tik and the stochastic distribution of the rival’s retail prices
(pjk)k=1,...,n, where each price pjk a priori depends on the realization of all
shocks εj ≡ (εjh)h=1,...,n, each retailer will select a tariff tik, a price pik and
an internal quantity transfer29 δik solution to:
max
(tik(.),pik,δik)k
E [
∑
k pik (di + εik − pik + σpjk (εj))− tik (di + εik − pik + σpjk (εj) + δik) |εi ]
tik (.) ∈ Tik,∑
k δik = 0.
Defining
pejk = E [pjk (εj)] ,
q¯ik = d+ εik − pik + σpejk + δik,
tˆik (q) = E
[
tik
(
q + di − d+ σ
(
pjk(εj)− pejk
))]
,
and denoting by Tˆik the set of “tariffs” obtained by applying the above trans-
formation to the original tariffs tik in Tik, the above program can be rewritten
as
max
(tˆik(.),pik,q¯ik)
k
∑
k
[
pik
(
d+ εik − pik + σpejk
)− tˆik (q¯ik)]
tˆik (.) ∈ Tˆik,∑
k
(
d+ εik − pik + σpejk
)
=
∑
k q¯ik.
It is useful to first characterize the distribution of retail prices, (pik)k=1,...,n,
for a given total “expected quantity” Qi =
∑
k q¯ik; those prices are solution
to:
max
(pik)k
∑
k pik
(
d+ εik + σp
e
jk − pik
)∑
k
(
d+ εik + σp
e
jk − pik
)
= Qi.
Denoting by λi the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint,
the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions are
d+ εik + σp
e
jk − 2pik + λi = 0,∑
k
(
d+ εik − pik + σpejk
)
= Qi,
29Each retailer k can transfer a quantity δˆikk′ to any other retailer k′ of the same
producer i; however, only the overall transfer δik = Σk′ δˆikk′ matters for our purpose.
Note that we do not allow retailers of one product to make quantity transfers contingent
on the other retailers’ ex post price, in order to avoid introducing interbrand links in the
contractual relations.
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and thus, eliminating λi:
pik = d− Qi
n
+
1
2
(
εik +
∑
h
εih
)
+
σ
2
(
pejk +
∑
h
pejh
)
. (31)
Using those conditions, the previous retailers’ program can be rewritten
as (ignoring terms that do not depend on the decision variables)
max
(tˆik(.),Qi,q¯ik)
k
[
d+ 1
n
(∑
k εik + σ
∑
k p
e
jk −Qi
)]
Qi − tˆik (q¯ik)
tˆik (.) ∈ Tˆik,∑
k q¯ik = Qi.
which depends on the realization of the local shocks (εik)k=1,...,n only through
the aggregate shock ε¯i ≡
∑
k εik. Therefore, Qi = Qi (ε¯i) and the retail prices
are of the form:
pik = pˆik (ε¯i) +
εik
2
,
where
pˆik (ε¯i) ≡ d+ 1
2
ε¯i − 1
n
Qi (ε¯i) +
σ
2
(
pejk +
∑
h
pejh
)
Therefore,
V ar [pik] = V ar
[
pˆik (ε¯i) +
εik
2
]
= E
[
(εik)
2
4
+ εikpˆik (ε¯i) + pˆ
2
ik (ε¯i)
]
=
1
4
V ar [εik] + E
[
εikpˆik (ε¯i) + pˆ
2
ik (ε¯i)
]
.
We now compute a lower bound of this variance by minimizing
E
[
εikf (ε¯i) + f
2 (ε¯i)
]
= E
[
E [εik |ε¯i ] f (ε¯i) + f 2 (ε¯i)
]
point by point, which yields:
E [εik |ε¯i ] + 2f (ε¯i) = 0,
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or f (ε¯i) = −12E [εik |ε¯i ] . Hence, a lower bound of the above variance is given
by
1
4
V ar [εik]− 1
2
E [εikEεi [εik |ε¯i ]] +
1
4
(E [εik |ε¯i ])2
=
1
4
{V ar [εik]− V ar [Eεi [εik |ε¯i ]]}
=
1
4
E [V ar [εik |ε¯i ]] .
When local shocks are independently and identically distributed, this
minimal variance increases with the number or retailers n and boils down in
the limit (n very large) to V ar [εik] /4, the variance generated by two-part
tariffs.
Remark: Information contained in quantities
In the case of a single market, observing the quantity sold is uninforma-
tive since all the information is already contained in the two retail prices.
In contrast, in a multi-market context where only a few prices are observed,
quantities may convey useful information. However in the presence of ex-
post aggregate demand shocks, this information is not sufficient to detect
deviations for sure, even with a very large number of markets. To see this,
assume that a manufacturer observes all of its retailers’ prices and the quan-
tity bought by each of them, but not the rival’s retail prices. Given the
contracts offered, manufacturer i can compute the retailers’ pricing policy
pik (εi) = pˆik(ε¯i) + εik/2. Observing all prices pik, the manufacturer can infer
ex-post ε¯i (since Σkpik (εi) only depends on ε¯i) and thus all individual shocks
εik. Therefore its retailers’ prices fully inform the manufacturer about its
own retailers’ information. We now show that it however provides only an
imperfect information about the rival’s prices.
The demand eventually addressed by retailer ik to manufacturer i is
qik = di + εik − pik + σpjk + δik (εi) ,
where pik is observed, and both εik and δik can be inferred, by the manufac-
turer. Therefore, observing both its retailers’ prices and quantities informs
manufacturer i on
di + σpjk.
Building on the above analysis, the retail prices pjk will take the form:
pjk = pˆj(ε¯j) +
εjk
2
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where pˆj(ε¯j) depends on the contracts offered by the rival. Therefore, the only
relevant information concerning the opponents actions contained in di+σpjk
is about pˆj(ε¯j), and the maximal useful information is thus contained in the
mean:
1
n
Σk (di + σpjk) = di + σpˆ (ε¯j) + σ
ε¯j
2n
.
Since di is independent from ε¯j, this is only a garbled information on the
opponents pricing strategy.
40
